Abstract. Kalyna is an SPN-based block cipher that was selected during Ukrainian national public cryptographic competition (2007)(2008)(2009)(2010), and its slight modification was approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. The cipher supports a block size and a key length of 128, 256 and 512 bits where the size of the key can be either double or equal to that of the block length. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the 128-bit and 256-bit block versions, respectively. In this paper, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced versions of Kalyna where the key size is double the block length. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach where we carefully deploy a four round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the pre-whitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2 89 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2 230.2 and a memory complexity of 2 202.64 . The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2 233 , 2 502.2 and 2 170 , respectively.
Introduction
Kalyna [17] is an SPN cipher that won the national public cryptographic competition [2] organized by the state service of special communication and information protection of Ukraine. This competition aimed to select a block cipher to become the new Ukrainian national encryption standard [16] and replace the legacy standard GOST 28147-89 [1] . Kalyna was chosen in 2014 and after a slight modification, in 2015, it officially became the new encryption standard of Ukraine known as DSTU 7624:2014 [1] .
Kalyna supports block sizes of 128-bit, 256-bit, and 512-bit, and key sizes of 128-bit, 256-bit, and 512-bit where the key size can be equal to or double the block length. In this paper we will refer to a specific version of the cipher as Kalyna−b/k, where b and k denote the employed block and key lengths, respectively. Although the exact analysis of the resistance of Kalyna to various attacks has not been discussed by its designer in [17] , they concluded that the cipher is sufficiently secure against several cryptanalytic methods after rounds five and six when the block size is 128-bit and 256-bit, respectively (cf. page 14 of [15] ).
The classical meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack [9] has not been successful on AES until Demirci and Selçuk proposed a modified MitM approach to cryptanalyze it [6] . They have shown that the value of a given byte of the output of a four round of encryption can be evaluated as a function of 25 byte parameters and a given active byte in the input. They also showed that the values of each output byte corresponding to the input byte values form an ordered sequence that can be used as a distinguishing property to identify the right key guess. The main disadvantage of their technique is the high memory complexity which is required by a precomputation table that is used to store all the sequences resulting from all the possible combinations of the 25 byte parameters. Accordingly, the approach was only valid to attack seven and eight rounds of AES-192 and AES-256, but not the 128-bit version. Afterwards, the number of parameters was reduced to 24 bytes in [7] where differences were used instead of the exact values in the ordered sequence, which reduced the size of the table by a factor of 8.
In the sequel, Dunkelman et al. targeted the problem of the high memory requirements of the MitM attack by introducing two new techniques [10] . They first proposed the idea of multisets which provides efficient encoding of the ordered sequence which reduces the size of the table by a factor of 4. Additionally, they introduced differential enumeration that enables the generation of ordered sequence as a function of 16 byte parameters only instead of 24, which reduced the number of entries of the table from 2 192 to 2 128 . This memory cost reduction was achieved by employing a truncated differential characteristic where the generated sequence at its output can only take a restricted number of values. Accordingly, one must initially search through a large amount of input data pairs to find one pair that satisfies the chosen distinguisher. Indeed, their proposal has reduced the memory complexity of the attack at the expense of its data complexity required to search for the right input data pair.
Later on, Derbez et al. [8] 80 . A direct consequence of their improvement is that the memory complexity is not the bottleneck of the attack anymore but both the time and data complexities are. Nevertheless, their attack is considered the most efficient attack on the 7-round reduced AES-128 and 8-round reduced AES-192/256. They have also used a 5-round distingusher to attack the 9-rounds reduced AES-256.
Afterwards, Li et al. [13] employed a key-dependent sieve to further reduce the memory complexity of the attack and present an attack on 9 rounds AES-192 using a 5-round truncated differential distinguisher. MitM attacks using differential enumeration have been used to analyze mCrypton [12] , the Russian encryption standard Kuznyechik [4] , and Hierocrypt-3 [3] . The attack was further generalized to present a framework for cryptanalyzing Feistel-based ciphers [11] .
In this work, we present a MitM attack on seven round reduced Kalyna-b/2b utilizing the idea of efficient differential enumeration. Kalyna employs a pre-and post-whitening key mixing using addition modulo 2 64 . Accordingly, we deploy a specific four round distinguisher that covers the first four rounds where the active byte is chosen to prevent the propagation of differences to the neighboring bytes. We also exploit the linear relation between odd and even indexed round keys to efficiently recover the last two round keys. The key schedule of Kalyna is designed to make it computationally infeasible to retrieve the master key from the round keys. For that reason, we propose an approach to recover all the round keys using parameters matching. Employing this proposed technique, we use the parameters corresponding to the matching multiset to filter pairs of two consecutive round keys guesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the description of the Kalyna block cipher along with the notation used throughout the paper are provided. Afterwards, in section 3, we provide a detailed description of the proposed distinguisher, the adopted attack procedure, and our round keys recovery approach. Finally, the paper is concluded in section 4.
Specifications of Kalyna
Our attack targets Kalyna-b/2b where the size of the key is double that of the state (i.e., Kalyna-128/256 and Kalyna-256/512). Accordingly, in this section, we give the description of the encryption and round key generation procedures of Kalyna-b/2b when b = 128 bits. The encryption procedure of Kalyna-128/256 and Kalyna-256/512 runs an AES-like round function for 14 and 18 times updating an 8 × c state, respectively, where c denotes the number of columns in the block state and is equal to 2 and 4 for the 128 and 256-bit block, respectively. As depicted in Figure 1 , the encryption procedure employs a pre-and post-whitening stages using addition modulo 2 64 applied on the state columns independently. In the sequel, the round function is iterated for 13 rounds. Each round applies the following transformations on the state: In the last round, the X transformation is replaced by a post-whitening modular key addition. Hence, the full encryption function of the Kalyna-128/256 where the ciphertext C is evaluated from the plaintext P can be described as:
In our analysis, we use the following property of the Sbox: , which is equal to (128 + 256 + 64)/64 = 7 for Kalyna-128/256. Given K α and K ω which denote the least and most significant k/2 = 128 bits of the master key, K = K ω ∥ K α , respectively, the state undergoes key mixing for three rounds where K α and K ω are used alternately. Afterwards, the even indexed round keys are generated independently by the process depicted on the right side of Figure 2 . The round key state is first initialized by K in , then it undergoes two encryption rounds where the intermediate key K σ is added to a round constant tmv i and used for key mixing. K in is evaluated according to the round number, i, and is given by the least significant 128-bit of (K > > > 16 · i) for round indices divisible by 4 and the most significant 128-bit of (K > > > 64 · ⌊i/4⌋) for round indices not divisible by 4. Odd indexed round keys are linearly computed from their previous even indexed round keys according to the formula:
Proposition 1 Given two non-zero differences in
For further details regarding the SBoxes, the linear transformation or the key schedule of other versions, the reader is referred to [17] .
Notations
The following notations are used throughout the paper: We measure memory complexity of our attack in b-bit Kalyna-b/2b blocks and time complexity in reduced-round Kalyna-b/2b encryptions. In the following section, we give the details of our MitM attack on Kalyna-128/256.
A Differential Enumeration MitM Attack on
Kalyna-128/256
In the employed MitM attack, the analyzed cipher C K is divided into three parts such that
where C m verifies a distinguishing property. The employed property is evaluated regardless of the key bits used in these middle rounds. Hence, round key candidates for k 1 and k 2 are checked if they verify this distinguishing property or not. Our middle distinguisher is a truncated differential characteristic such that, when a set of input states from a δ-set [5] is used as its input, the set of a given byte difference of the output state forms an ordered sequence which can be represented using a multiset. 
Definition 2 (Multisets of bytes) A multiset generalizes the set concept by allowing elements to appear more than once. In our case, a multiset of 256 bytes can take as many as
17 different values [10] .
In our 7-round MitM attack, we employ a four round distinguisher that covers the following transitions:
As depicted in Figure 3 , the distinguisher starts at x 0 where byte x 0 [15] takes all the possible 2 8 values and ends at z 4 , where we evaluate the multiset of the 255 differences by partially encrypting the 256 values of x 0 . We specifically locate the distinguisher in the first four rounds which enables us to exploit the linear relation between the last two round keys and attack seven rounds. Additionally, we choose the active byte at the beginning of the distinguisher in the most significant byte of the second column to prevent the propagation of the difference to the neighboring bytes, which can happen due to the carry propagation resulting from the modular addition key mixing. On the other hand, placing the distinguisher in the middle as in the traditional setting [6, 12] allows us to attack six rounds only. Also, we must deal with the probabilistic carry propagation in the analysis of the first round which reduces the path probability, and hence both the data and time complexities of the attack are increased. It should be noted that while our distinguisher ends with four active bytes which increases the path probability when we evaluate the multiset from the ciphertext side, this distinguisher does not affect the memory complexity because we store a multiset of the differences in only one of the four active bytes. In other words, since each byte out of the four active bytes at the end of the distinguisher forms an ordered sequence, we can choose any of them to distinguish between key candidates as long as the probability of error is negligible.
We denote the δ-set at state x 0 by δs, where
We also denote the set of 255 differences at bytes z 4 [0 · · · 3] by ds, where
and
We opt for variating the most significant byte of state x 0 because plaintext pairs that differ in this byte result in one byte difference in x 0 after the modular addition key mixing as the carry is inhibited at the most significant bit. Since, we are using a multiset to encode the resulting set of differences, ds is evaluated by partially encrypting the 256 bytes which are different in state y 0 for 4 rounds as these set of states also form an unordered delta set corresponding to δs. We employ multisets to encode sets of differences in one of the resulting four byte differences only, which is possible because the probability of having a false match when using one byte differences is almost negligible. From the path depicted in Figure 3 
Attack Procedure
The attack exploits the linear relationship between consecutive even and odd indexed round keys to recover the last two 128-bit round keys K 7 and K 6 . However, even with the knowledge of these two round keys, the recovery of the master key requires a time complexity equals to that of the exhaustive search. Consequently, once these two keys are known, we propose an additional step that recovers all the preceding round keys using parameters matching. The attack is composed of precomputation and online phases. In the precomputation phase, for each value of the values of the 25-byte parameters, we deduce the corresponding 37 bytes values which are then used to compute the multiset and store it in a hash table. The online phase is further divided into data collection, and key recovery phases. In the data collection phase, we query the encryption oracle with chosen plaintext pairs to find at least one pair that satisfies the 7-round path shown in Figure 3 . In the key recovery phase, we test guesses of K 7 and K 6 with each plaintext pair to evaluate the multiset and search for it in the precomputed table.
Precomputaion phase: In this phase, we build a lookup 
-Encode the sequence of one out of the four generated byte differences, (i.e., ∆ i z 4 [j], j = 0, 1, 2, 3) using a multiset and store it in a hash table.
Online phase: This phase is divided into two stages, data collection and key recovery. In the first stage, we collect enough pairs of plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts so that we acquire at least one pair that follows the path depicted in Figure 3 . The second stage employs key guesses for K 7 and K 6 to evaluate candidate multisets from the collected ciphertext pairs, and matches them against the ones stored in the precomputed table to identify the correct round keys.
Data collection
In this stage, we query the encryption oracle with structures of chosen plaintexts to get enough pairs such that one of them conforms to the whole truncated differential path. For each structure, we let the most significant state byte take all the possible 2 8 values and set the remaining 15 bytes to a constant value. We specifically choose to variate the most significant byte to ensure that we get one active byte at the beginning of the distinguisher after the modular addition key mixing. In other words, the carry generated by the modular addition is inhibited in the last bit of this byte, thus one active byte in the plaintext propagates to one active byte in x 0 with certainty. This structure results in about
pairs. While a chosen plaintext pair follows the forward path with certainty, the probability that its corresponding ciphertext pair conforms to the backward path is 2 −96 . This probability is due to the 16 → 8 and 8 → 4 transitions through the inverse MixColumn transformation in rounds six and five, respectively. Accordingly, it is expected that when trying 2 96 plaintext pairs, the corresponding ciphertext pair of one of them follows the path in Figure 3 . Since, each structure provides 2 15 pairs, one requires about 2 81 structures. All in all, we ask for the encryption of 2 81 × 2 8 = 2 89 chosen plaintexts to get the required 2 96 pairs.
Key recovery: In this stage, for each plaintext pair (P 0 , P ′ 0 ), we pick P 0 and construct the rest of the 255 plaintexts in its delta set by P i = P 0 ⊕ i for i = 1, 2, · · · , 255. Then, we get their corresponding 256 cipher texts C i for i = 0, 1, · · · , 255, partially decrypt them using guesses for K 7 and K 6 to get the 255 differences ∆ i z 4 [0 · · · 3]. Note that we do not require to guess any bits from K 5 because the difference in x 5 can be linearly propagated to get the difference in z 4 . In this stage, we exploit the linear relation between even and odd indexed round keys to identify the right K 7 and K 6 by guessing K 7 only and getting K 6 candidates for free. Finally, we evaluate the multiset of the 255 differences in one out of the four bytes in ∆ i z 4 [0 · · · 3] (the same byte that was used in the precomputation phase), and look for a match in the precomuted table. If a match is not found, we can discard that key candidate. The probability of a false match is given by 2 200+96+128−467.6 = 2 −43.6 which is negligible. Note that the probability of randomly having a match in the table is 2 −467.6 (and not 2 −506.7 ) because the number of ordered sequences associated to a multiset is not constant [8] .
